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Introduction 
The One Health Concept describes collaboration between different health sectors and often refers to 
the interaction between animals, people, food, feed and the environment. Today, most integrated One 
Health Initiatives encompasses only a few of the sectors. One Health is particularly valuable when 
combatting foodborne zoonoses and antimicrobial resistance, where cross-sector collaboration can lead 
to faster and more cost-effective control.  
Traditionally in the EU, surveillance is carried out within sectors with defined areas of responsibilities, 
communication channels and risk management roles. However, the advantage of using One Health 
principles is becoming more apparent and Member States (MS) are beginning to define, structure and 
implement cross-sector collaborations. It is rare to find full cross-sectorial surveillance systems, but 
smaller One Health Surveillance Initiatives (OHSI) are integrated in many MS today.  
OHSI are often implemented to address a specific problem or as a response to an adverse event. Once 
implemented, they remain operational in the context, become part of the surveillance routine and are 
often adjusted as new needs arise. They are implemented at different steps in the surveillance pathway 
and usually include multiple stakeholders from two or more sectors as illustrated in the figure below. 
 
 
 
These OHSI add value for the country by improving the surveillance system, but they are rarely 
published or shared in detail with other countries. At the same time, many countries are considering 
more interaction and collaboration in their surveillance systems and are looking for inspiration among 
the published initiatives.  
We have gathered examples of integrated OHSI in European MS and beyond via questionnaires and 
interviews. This catalogue describes some of OHSI and we hope they will inspire others to use the ideas 
and approaches to introduce more One Health into their own surveillance systems.  
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OH Surveillance of Human Listeriosis - France 
In France, human listeriosis has been notifiable since 1999. Cases are reported to the French Public 
Health Agency (PHA), and human Listeria monocytogenes (Lm) isolates are forwarded to the National 
Reference Center (NRC) for Listeria at the Pasteur Institute for core-genome Multilocus Sequence 
Typing (cgMLST) techniques. Approximately 400 cases of human listeriosis are reported annually of 
which 99-100% isolates are received at the NRC. 
The NRC also receives food and environmental Lm strains isolated from 1) “food alerts” from the 
Ministry of Agriculture (MoA)” when food exceeds the regulation-defined threshold of Lm, 2) testing of 
food from the homes of patients with neurolisteriosis as part of the national surveillance strategy and 
3) food producers’ internal checks. All isolates from 1 and 2 are included in the National Surveillance 
System directly. Isolates from producers’ internal checks are typed at the NRC based on private 
contracts and are only included, if cgMLST matches a case. The surveillance system then has power to 
request disclosure of information from the producer including type of food, date of collection and name 
of the company to facilitate an investigation in a timely manner. 
Additionally, the National Reference Laboratory (NRL) of the Food Safety Agency test food and 
environmental samples from National Plans for Surveillance and Control of Listeria in the Food Chain 
and from other control programmes and surveys that are conducted annually to assess Lm-
contamination of selected food items. These isolates can also be shared with the National Surveillance 
System, although the NRL has not fully transitioned to WGS-based typing yet. 
The French national surveillance for listeriosis consists of an epidemiological information on human 
cases from PHA, on microbiological surveillance of human, food and environmental samples performed 
by the NRC and on samples from surveillance at the NRL. Both the Ministry of Health and the MoA fund 
the surveillance activities. 
CgMLST-based microbiological surveillance performed weekly by the NRC identifies clusters of matching 
isolates and share these with the PHA and the MoA. Clusters involving at least one human case are 
jointly investigated by the PHA, the MoA and the NRC. Clusters that do not include human isolates are 
investigated by the MoA and the NRC. Merging of information from the PHA, the NRC and the MoA 
databases allows for efficient sharing of relevant data between agencies and timely investigations.  
The close collaboration between the PHA, the MoA and the NRC has increased the number of solved 
clusters and outbreaks since 2015. In the future, the aim is to include food and environmental Lm 
isolates received at the NRL in the National Surveillance System. 
The OH challenge is that each agency is responsible for their own databases on separate servers. Full 
integration would require a storage solution that allows for joint storage and sharing without 
compromising the integrity of the original data. 
 
Santé publique France (Public Health Agency)  
http://invs.santepubliquefrance.fr/en 
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Food Bug - Finland 
Since 2010, surveillance data on Salmonella and EHEC/VTEC in Finland is shared by a routine procedure 
between THL (National Institute for Health and Welfare, including The Central Laboratory for Public 
Health) and EVIRA (Finnish Food Safety Authority, including animal health and welfare). The procedure 
varies by pathogen, but consists of an email sent to a list of recipients including people from 
epidemiological surveillance and laboratory from THL and EVIRA, with the subject “Food Bug”. The 
recipient list is updated as frequently as needed.  
This procedure started as a minor part of a research project that recognized a need to share data for 
outbreaks and routine surveillance weekly between food and public health authorities. The project 
included molecular typing on Salmonella and EHEC and at the time, also PFGE gel photos were 
exchanged between the institutes for comparison. Food Bug is a continuation of the project.  
Every Friday THL shares the list of isolates from domestic Salmonella cases typed at the laboratory 
during that week with the Food Bug list. The list contains an ID for the isolates, the serotype, and 
resistance profile. EVIRA does the same, but because Salmonella isolates are seldom found in food and 
food-producing animals in Finland, their email is not sent weekly, but rather when a set of isolates is 
ready according to the laboratory logistics. Isolates are sequenced if a match is found based on time, 
location and type of human and food or veterinary isolates. 
For EHEC/VTEC, human cases happen more rarely than Salmonella and the email is sent less frequently. 
When cases are reported, an investigation is initiated to locate farm contacts and the Food-Bug email 
is sent when this information is available. This list contains the stx-type and serotype of the isolates, 
the patients’ age, municipality, farm contacts and some clinical information. Due to confidential content, 
these data is sent by secure email. EVIRA then proceeds to collect samples at the listed farm sites to 
try to find matching isolates. 
This procedure promotes frequent interdisciplinary contact, which bring people from both sectors closer 
together and makes it easier for them to call and ask each other questions, or to resolve any issues. 
From an operational point of view, the EHEC/VTEC list with farm contacts gives EVIRA a risk-based 
approach to target their sampling and results in a more efficient way to collect EHEC/VTEC data. 
One challenge originating from the Food Bug format is the new data privacy regulations, because 
regular emails cannot be used to send personal information and metadata. The institutes have agreed 
on a minimal amount of metadata to send by a secure email server, but will need a more sophisticated 
system allowing more complete metadata sharing.  
For sharing sequences, the intention is to start using Innuendo, a cross-sectorial platform for genomics 
of foodborne pathogens, created in a project involving Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Portugal, The Basque 
Autonomous Community in Spain and Austria. The development of Innuendo was partially funded by 
EFSA. In Finland, the platform will be used for national purposes, for direct comparison of sequences 
from human, veterinary and food sources.  
 
National Institute for Health and Welfare, Finland 
https://thl.fi/en/web/thlfi-en 
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The Business Intelligence System (BI) - Switzerland 
The Business Intelligence System (BI BLW/BLV) is a centralized data warehouse intended to store data 
from the food chain - and in the future public health data. It currently includes data provided by the 
Swiss Veterinary Service (BLV) and the Federal Office for Agriculture (BLW). It does not include data 
from Public Health yet. The following description covers the view of the BLV. 
The Cantons of the Swiss Federation collect a large amount of data through several systems, but the 
access and use of such data for public service or academic purposes is not very easy. For that reason, 
the BI was created in 2016 with the objectives of improving access and harmonizing the data reported 
by the Cantons, thus reducing the workload for people analyzing data for different reports. The 
warehouse is part of the Swiss e-government structure, and the funding for its creation and operation 
comes from the internal IT budget of BLV and BLW. 
Veterinary data reported to the BI include laboratory data on notifiable diseases according to Swiss 
legislation (including pets), zoonoses, abortions, somatic cell counts from milk analyses, antimicrobial 
resistance as well as samples collected to prove freedom of disease or from eradication programmes 
(e.g. BVD and S. aureus). Some of this data is also reported to EFSA. 
There is currently no structure to store genetic sequencing data, so the system contains isolate 
information and basic metadata, like date of collection, species and sampling programme. Antibiotic 
resistance data in animals is included in a simplified format, as the system is not able to support the 
current results format for antibiograms. Data collected by the Cantons are reported through systems 
known as “central applications” and the BI extracts data from those applications.  
Data is collected from control visits in primary production (animal health, animal welfare, food safety 
and agricultural practice) and from business processes (animal welfare in pets, authorizations for 
businesses or persons in the veterinary sector and measures taken). Furthermore, data of the national 
registers for enterprises and animal movements are included in the Data Warehouse. Although the BLW 
and BLV operate a common infrastructure, the use of the data matches the fields of responsibilities of 
the institutions.  
Even though this initiative is reasonably recent and does not yet fully meet its integration objectives, it 
has succeeded in increasing the use of the data by people in the veterinary and agricultural services, 
because access has been facilitated. As a consequence, these users have now a better understanding 
of the need for high-quality data, which in turn resulted in an increase in data quality and reporting.  
The main OH challenge is to develop a legal framework that supports inclusion of human data and 
improve food data reporting by the cantons. 
 
Swiss Veterinary Service   
https://www.blv.admin.ch/blv/en/home/das-blv/organisation/veterinaerdienst-schweiz.html 
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The Zoonosis Plenum - Denmark 
The Zoonosis Plenum (ZP) takes place as meetings between microbiologists, epidemiologists and 
decision makers working in surveillance in the different sectors, with the objective of reducing 
foodborne pathogens in Denmark. The plenary meetings started in the late 1980s after a large national 
Salmonella outbreak. During the investigation and control activities, it became clear that collaboration 
between human, food and veterinary sectors was not very well established. To address this and as part 
of creating the Danish Zoonosis Center, monthly meetings were held with collaborating partners from 
public health, veterinary and food agencies. The National Food Institute, Technical University of 
Denmark has been organizing the meetings since the beginning.  
The main focus of the ZP was historically Salmonella and Campylobacter in humans, poultry, pigs and 
dairy cattle and alongside action plans and close collaboration with the private sector and the ZP has 
been an important piece in the jigsaw puzzle to successfully reduce Salmonella in Danish meat 
production. The structure is quite informal and revolves around information on the current situation in 
each sector. Participants present slides with a summary of their latest observations concerning 
prevalence estimates, outbreaks, emerging pathogen types, research results etc. Findings are discussed 
and cross-sector explanations and expertise are shared to explain unusual observations including 
explanation to data errors or surveillance artifacts in some part of the surveillance chain.  
Presently, the plenary meetings occur three times per year with all interested participants from Statens 
Serum Institut (public health institute), the National Food Authority, the National Food Institute and 
the National Veterinary Institute. All current stakeholders are public or academic institutions, and 
include both risk assessors and risk managers.  
The main outcome of this initiative is well-established inter-sectoral communication. Summarized data, 
expertise and crucial information is shared during the meetings, increasing trust and building 
collaborative spirit, which are both fundamental for One Health.  
The main challenge facing the ZPs is the bittersweet result of its own success. Control of Salmonella in 
Denmark has been highly successful and the threat from zoonoses is reduced considerably due to 
national, collaborative and effective efforts. Established multi-sector national action plans and 
surveillance programs are running and relevant staff are finding it hard to prioritize time for the ZP 
meetings among other priorities and activities. 
 
National Food Institute, Technical University of Denmark  
https://www.food.dtu.dk/english/scientific-advice/surveillance-and-monitoring 
 
  
7 
 
 
Working Group One Health (WGOH) - Switzerland 
The Working Group One Health was established in 2018 by members of the Subsidiary Body of One 
Health (SBOH-described elsewhere) members, who work at the Federal Food Safety and Veterinary 
Office (FSVO). The WGOH was created as a way of strengthening interdisciplinary collaboration within 
the FSVO after merging the sections of Food Safety and Nutrition of the Federal Office of Public Health 
and the Federal Veterinary Office. The WGOH source members from different FSVO Sections: Animal 
Health, Animal Welfare, International Affairs, Food Safety and Nutrition, Logistics and Informatics, Risk 
Surveillance, and Communication. The WGOH is part of the SBOH created to promote better integration 
between the Public Health, Animal Health and Food Safety sectors in Switzerland, with the objective to 
improve the detection, surveillance, prevention and control of zoonoses and vector-borne diseases, 
under a One Health framework. 
The working group meets four times a year to strengthen the interdisciplinary collaboration and 
information flow concerning One Health topics. This group discusses cross-sectoral issues or new 
epidemiological situations and their recommendations and inputs feed into the SBOH meetings. The 
group functions as an internal panel of experts that influences the topics of discussion in the SBOH, 
covering the same populations and hazards as the Subsidiary Body. They invite external experts, but 
only involve public stakeholders and have no members from private industries.  
One of the benefits of the working group is that it expands the number of people, who give input to 
the SBOH beyond their narrow membership and increasing the number of people working with One 
Health. Members of the WGOH participate in the group as an ad hoc activity within normal FSVO work 
time.  
A main challenge is that a formal identification of One Health is still missing, resulting in a lack of 
meaning of terms like “OH people” or “OH activities”. The OH mentality is not widely spread and others 
do not consider cross-sector activities. This reduces the probability that an OH issue is brought to the 
attention of the SBOH and the WGOH. 
 
Subsidiary Body One Health, Federal Food Safety and Veterinary Office, Switzerland 
https://www.blv.admin.ch/blv/en/home.html 
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Annual Report on Zoonoses in Estonia - Estonia 
The Annual Report on Zoonoses in Estonia has since 2005 reported on the epidemiological situation 
and trends of zoonotic agents. The report present information on zoonotic agents of national importance 
in Estonia including those reported to EFSA. It is jointly produced by The Veterinary and Food Board 
(VFB), The Health Board, Veterinary and Food Laboratories, Public Health Laboratory and the 
Agricultural Register and Information Board.  
The report production began in 2005 after accession to the European Union (EU), where surveillance 
data on zoonotic pathogens in animals and humans were requested by EFSA and soon after, human 
data were also submitted to ECDC. In response to these data demands, Estonia started to collect and 
summarize the data in a systematic manner. Local veterinary laboratories, food laboratories and the 
Health Board laboratory test and type samples for the surveillance. Except for Salmonella isolates, 
which are typed at the Central Veterinary and Food laboratory. Results from food samples are stored 
in the database at the VFB including all the metadata required for EFSA reporting, who also receive the 
data from animal samples by email.  The VFB produces the report using EFSA’s reporting spreadsheets. 
On request from VFB, the Health Board emails human data aggregated as number of cases per disease 
alongside foodborne outbreaks according to EFSA guidelines. The industry provides the data that is 
required to by legislation. This includes number of carcasses sampled according to microbiological 
criteria regulation and samples from the Salmonella control programme in poultry. Academic data is 
not included in the report, because the EFSA data aims to follow trends over time and research data 
frequently only covers two or three years, starts at odd months and lacks the uniformity required by 
EU standards.  
The report is connected to other national initiatives, besides the official reporting to EFSA. The report 
in Estonian is produced after reporting to EFSA and includes data on other zoonoses that are important 
for the country. The joint reporting and the habit of sharing data have improved communication 
between the different sectors and makes it easier to detect and discuss cross-sectorial issues. The main 
issue currently faced by the report editors is the double workload generated by reporting the data to 
EFSA and EC in English and producing their own report in Estonian for national use. 
Some of the OH challenges are that data transfer and collation occurs only as data exchange under 
request between The Central Public Health Laboratory and VFB, not routinely.  
 
Estonian Veterinary and Food Board  
http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/biological-hazards-data/reports 
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Report on Surveillance of Infectious Disease in Animal and Humans - 
Sweden 
The Report on Surveillance of Infectious Diseases in Animals and Humans is a yearly report produced 
by the Swedish Veterinary Institute (SVA), containing epidemiological summaries on infectious diseases 
of Animal Health or Public Health importance in Sweden. The chapters on the zoonotic diseases include 
among others Salmonella, Campylobacter, EHEC/VTEC, Yersinia, Influenza and Brucellosis. Overlap in 
the zoonoses chapters between the sectors do exist. The main objective of the report is to disseminate 
surveillance results, but also to provide a clear, uniform description of Swedish surveillance efforts in 
each chapter for readers and stakeholders to understand how the surveillance for each disease was 
carried out. Every chapter starts with the methodological description followed by the results. Due to a 
history of effective control programmes, good health system and biosecurity policies, no detection or 
low prevalence of pathogens are frequent, but inclusion of these are important as it is important to 
document that surveillance was carried out effectively.   
In the beginning, The Public Health Agency and SVA each produced their own reports, frequently 
describing the same pathogens. The joint reporting allows experts, to some extent, to perform shared 
analyses and co-write chapters with a shared conclusion. The report started as a task commissioned 
and funded by The Swedish Board of Agriculture to SVA. Presently, it is part of the core activities at 
SVA and the production is part of their internal budget. Besides the three institutes, surveillance 
activities in the field of animal health is also carried out by the industry, through organisations such as 
Farm & Animal Health, Växa Sverige and The Swedish Poultry Association. These private stakeholders 
execute part of the surveillance activities, collecting samples, testing for the presence of pathogens, 
and summarizing some of the data. Transfer of data happens from the private stakeholders, Swedish 
Board of Agriculture to SVA for animal results and herd/population data, but human and food data are, 
in most cases, analysed at their own respective institutes and not shared directly. 
Albeit being a joint report, information for each sector and pathogen still is, in many cases, analysed 
and written independently by sector experts before collation by the editors. Interdisciplinary 
collaboration is an on-going aim, which is prioritised to some degree. Although the report only organizes 
a few startup meetings to decide on inclusion of chapters and authors, VTEC, Salmonella and 
Campylobacter have extra meetings throughout the year, to ensure that there will be a collaborative 
interpretation of the data to avoid flawed or siloed conclusions.  
The editors consider that the largest benefit obtained from the cross-sectional efforts is a better quality 
of the material presented. The collaborative interpretations reduce the chance for writer and reader 
misinterpretation, and historically, criticisms to the report’s contents have mostly happened in relation 
to chapters in which there was a lack of collaboration among experts. Another outcome is the 
establishment of an active partnership among the three sectors, which facilitates future collaborations 
as well. 
 
National Veterinary Institute (SVA), Sweden  
https://www.sva.se/en/about-sva/reports-and-publications-in-english/disease-surveillance/disease-
surveillance-reports 
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Zoonoses Working Group in the Croatian Food Agency – Croatia 
The Zoonoses Working Group was established in 2014 in order to improve communication on 
surveillance and reporting of zoonoses across sectors nationally as an addition to local collaboration.  
The group’s membership consists of experts from The Directorate of Sanitary Inspection (Ministry of 
Health), The Directorate for Veterinary and Food Safety (Ministry of Agriculture), The Croatian 
Veterinary Institute, The Croatian Institute for Public Health, The Croatian Food Agency and The Faculty 
of Veterinary Medicine of the University of Zagreb. So far, there has been no participation from the 
private sector and no collaborations with the industry. 
Working Group members meet three to four times a year and their main tasks are to produce the 
Croatian Zoonoses Report, as well as to discuss how to improve zoonoses surveillance in human and 
animal health. Their agenda is focused on emerging diseases, epidemiological trends, laboratory 
capacities and limitations, and public health emergencies involving zoonotic pathogens. The group 
covers a wide range of agents monitored by the two sectors: Brucella, Listeria, Bovine Spongiform 
Encephalopathy, Echinococcus, Campylobacter, Salmonella and Trichinella. In the case of emerging 
diseases, strategies for communication and coordination between affected regions and their neighbors 
are also discussed and initiated. There is no direct sharing of data; pre-analysed and summarised 
numbers form each Office are presented as slides, to be discussed together. There is also no specific 
funding for the Working Group. Meetings are organised by the Croatian Food Agency and members 
participate as an ad hoc activity out of personal interest in the subject and objectives. 
The benefits from the initiative include improved communication between sectors. People from different 
sectors met for the first time with the initiation of the Zoonoses Working Group and it has led to 
familiarity and improved communications when needed. Another positive outcome is the production of 
the annual report, which was first published in 2014. In 2018, the report will for the first time include 
a chapter on antimicrobial resistance and several summaries of diseases that are not part of EFSA’s 
mandatory notification list. 
The main challenge today is the group’s sustainability as there is no specific funding allocated and it 
depends solely on the continued priority and interest of the members.  
 
Croatian Food Agency  
https://www.hah.hr/en/o-hah-u/radna-grupa-za-zoonoze/ 
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Brucellosis surveillance - France 
As a large exporter of raw milk cheeses, France has had very well-established systems for surveillance 
and control of brucellosis since the 1960s. The system collects epidemiological knowledge in humans 
and susceptible domestic animals systematically, including event-based syndromic surveillance in wild 
animals. The aim is to improve risk analysis and strategies for prevention and eradication of the disease 
both in humans and in animal populations. 
The country has been officially free of brucellosis in cattle since 2005 and the last case in sheep and 
goats was reported in 2003. Sheep and goats are still vaccinated, because of difficulties in control of 
animals during alpine pasture in the southern French Alps obstructing the possibility of brucellosis-free 
status in these species. A re-emergence in cattle occurred in in 2011, in northern French Alps, where 
cattle were infected by wildlife (Ibex) during alpine pasture. Bulk tank milk for cheese production is 
regularly tested as part of requirements for the product certification and food is only imported from 
countries officially free of brucellosis or from producers that are certified-free in non-free countries.  
Human surveillance is mostly carried out to understand epidemiological changes of the disease and to 
alert the Santé Publique France (national public health institute, SPF). Nowadays most 
domestic/autochtonous cases are employees from diagnostic laboratories, shifting away from the 
historic farmer/veterinarian occupational infections. Most other human cases have been infected by 
direct contact with animals or consumption of raw milk and raw milk products in other countries. Animal 
and food surveillance is carried out to ascertain that they can stay brucellosis free, and to certify their 
products in other countries. Summarised yearly data are reported to ECDC and EFSA. Each human case 
without any obvious at-risk exposure instigate a multi-disciplinary investigation by The French Agency 
for Food, Environmental and Occupational Health & Safety (ANSES, animal health), SPF and the National 
Hunting and Wildlife Agency with the aim to classify it as a travel-related case or to identify the French 
herd they had contact with. In the same manner, if an infective herd identified by ANSES, they 
immediately contact SPF, to look for human cases in the local area.  
Human samples are tested and isolates typed at The National Reference Laboratory for human 
brucellosis, which is part of the Bacteriology Department at The Nîmes University Hospital.  ANSES 
types animal isolates. In case of outbreaks, strains are shared between institutes, but since animals are 
a free only human isolates are available. Each agency pays for their own activities as part of The 
National Surveillance System.  
The personnel from different sectors, who handle brucellosis outbreaks are usually also responsible for 
other pathogens and meet in person or through conference calls almost every day. This means that 
trust and communication channels are very well established and frequently used between the sectors, 
making it easier to compare information and solve outbreaks. The challenge, ironically, comes as 
consequence of their success: Because France has been free of brucellosis for a long time, municipal 
and regional offices frequently lack people with expertise in the disease, making the system very 
dependent on the national authorities. 
 
Santé Publique France (Public Health Agency)  
http://www.santepubliquefrance.fr/ 
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The Veterinary Risk Group (VRG) – United Kingdom 
The Veterinary Risk Group (VRG) was created in 2009, in response to the independent Anderson Review 
on the large Foot-and-Mouth Disease outbreak in the UK in 2001. It identified a need for a transparent, 
rapid and consistent way to rapidly escalate and prioritise animal health and welfare related threats to 
decision makers and the Human Animal Infections and Risk Surveillance Group (HAIRS) and VRG were 
created. The VRG assesses potential threats to and from animals in England, Wales, Scotland and 
Northern Ireland, while HAIRS’s focus is on the assessment of potential zoonotic threats to public health. 
The VRG is a technical group that delivers for the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, 
Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Department of Agriculture, Environment and Rural Affairs 
in Northern Ireland. The core is a group of risk analysis experts with technical and policy-related roles.  
A network of risk managers bring issues or potential threats to the monthly meetings for assessment 
and participate to stay informed about threats that may have the potential to affect their area. Two 
types of issues are dealt with in the meetings: 1) “threats” for which there are no clear policy owners 
for response and may need actions across sectorial or agency borders; and 2) “points for information”, 
which describe an ongoing or developing serious situation that has a clear policy or protocol for 
management. An example are the recent BSE cases in the UK, which are of great concern. Unless a 
subtle change in the issue occur, it remains a point for information in VRG to keep track of the situation. 
Threats are assessed in monthly meetings and the group produces advice on technical aspects. 
Although the focus is on animal health and welfare, the VRG assessment of the threat includes the 
impact on public health and the public perception. All identified public health threats are forwarded to 
HAIRS for a full assessment on the risk to public health. The communication with HAIRS is consistent 
and meeting minutes are shared between the two groups. Furthermore, several members have joint 
memberships and established methods for transferring ownership, allowing individuals in HAIRS to 
become aware of serious threats and the detailed discussions in VRG. 
VRG core members and risk managers are mainly from DEFRA, the Animal and Plant Health Agency, 
the Welsh Government, the Scottish Government, the Department of Agriculture, Environment and 
Rural Affairs of Northern Ireland, Local Authorities, Centre for Environment, Fisheries and Aquaculture 
Science, Veterinary Medicines Directorate and the Food Standards Agency. Private institutions or 
industry representative bodies are not members of VRG, but some of the risk managers are part of 
veterinary and industry sector networks and thereby maintain relationships with the industry, which 
allows bringing intelligence and threats from industry for assessment in VRG meetings. The group is 
independent of named programs or initiatives, and receives no specific funding, as the activities are 
part of core functions of the agencies involved.  
The data brought to the meetings is evidence that has been assessed and interpreted by their agencies 
of origin. Some examples are prevalence, increases in incidence, or references to peer-reviewed papers. 
Another type of data is intelligence from the industry submitted by the connected risk managers. As 
the threats are usually new or emerging, the pre-assessments are highly dependent on the type and 
amount of evidence available, frequently resulting in recommendations to fill data gaps. Data, evidence, 
and discussions are kept under data protection with two levels of sensitivity. The authorities receive 
the full report of all assessments and recommendations with a more general and less detailed report 
more widely shared. This ensures transparency without enclosing sensitive information. 
Furthermore, VRG has an annual workshop to evaluate the ways-of-working and suggest improvements 
or changes. This involvement of everyone in the evaluation and optimisation is essential in keeping 
challenges and difficulties under control. 
The biggest benefit from VRG is that issues and threats identified are promptly managed even if they 
do not have an official ownership or response protocol, and many other benefits such as standardised 
assessments across sectors, collaboration and regular communications across many agencies and 
government departments are also apparent.  
 
Animal and Plant Health Agency, UK, Email: vrg@apha.gov.uk  
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Early Warning Meeting on Zoonoses – The Netherlands 
The Early Warning Meeting on Zoonoses (EWMZ) is a monthly meeting for early detection of zoonotic 
signals in livestock, pets, vectors, wildlife and humans. In EWMZ meetings, the potential risk of 
zoonoses to public health is assessed and the focus is mainly non-notifiable pathogens, where no official 
control protocols exist. The Netherlands Food and Product Consumer Safety Authority (NVWA), the 
Faculty of Veterinary Medicine of Utrecht University, National Institute for Public Health and the 
Environment (RIVM), Wageningen Bioveterinary Research and GD Animal Health are represented by 
people in senior research and/or upper management positions with a broad scientific background and 
a mandate to make decisions on action.  
The EWMZ originated from a large Q-Fever (Coxiella burnetii) outbreak in goats in 2007-2010. At that 
time, collaboration between the veterinary and public health sectors was not common and roles not 
well-defined. This led to some conflict of interest between the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of 
Health, Welfare and Sport, and the private laboratories running detection tests for Q-Fever resulting in 
inefficient reporting of positive farms among other things that slowed the control response. In 2009, 
the Dutch government concluded that a human-veterinary integrated risk analysis structure was needed 
to determine appropriate response actions and initiated the project to design such a structure. Initial 
investigations included comparing types of surveillance used in the public health and veterinary sectors 
incl. terminology and the ranking of zoonotic diseases according to their potential public health impact. 
Data sharing taking into account all privacy issues and potential conflicts of interest also needed solving. 
In 2011, an official suggestion on a full Zoonoses Structure was submitted to the Dutch government, 
assigning the roles, responsibilities and mandates of each partner during the EWMZ meetings and in 
response situations. 
Today, approximately 15 people participates in a monthly EWMZ. Further meetings take place on an 
ad hoc basis in urgent situations. Each organization brings information on non-notifiable pathogens of 
current importance detected as signals by their surveillance systems. A joint assessment is made to 
determine whether a signal requires further action, which measures could be taken and whether further 
research or information is needed. In principle, if the exchange of data is necessary to assess a signal, 
data is shared between sectors. However, sharing of actual data is rare because the focus is non-
notifiable diseases, where no regular data is collected. Examples of reasons for action are: Lack of 
knowledge in some populations, a new disease with unknown impact, high media attention or a threat 
with potential to cause social unrest.  
The main benefit is that non-notifiable diseases are regularly assessed leading to actions, even though 
no specific protocols and control programmes exists. However, the regular meetings EWMZ has also 
led to familiarity between members and organizations, a build-up of trust resulting more sharing of 
information. It has developed a sense of community between personnel of the multiple sectors, which 
also facilitates collaborations on other cross-sectorial projects.  
The challenge of different perspectives between sector remains and it is not always easy to agree and 
justify taking action against potential threats from a resources and budget point of view. From a public 
health perspective, the prevalence in the animal population needs to be rather high to pose a risk to 
public health, because many zoonotic diseases depend on animal-human transmission. This occasionally 
undermines the usefulness of early warning surveillance in animal populations and pathogens may 
become established before action is seen as justified.  
 
RIVM Centre for Infectious Disease Control, the Netherlands 
https://www.rivm.nl/sites/default/files/2018-11/Folder%20signalling%20zoonoses%202018.pdf 
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Subsidiary Body One Health (SBOH) - Switzerland 
The Subsidiary Body One Health was established in 2017 under the Federal Food Safety and Veterinary 
Office in the Federal Department of Home Affairs. A Coordinating Body for disease surveillance was 
initially created under the Swiss Epidemics Act, but it became apparent that zoonotic diseases needed 
a special approach, as they involve more complex systems than other Public Health threats including 
food, livestock and wild reservoirs. For that reason, the SBOH was founded, integrating Public Health, 
Animal Health, Agriculture, Environment and Food Safety. 
Although the SBOH is free to act in respect to any public health threats or hazards, its main objective 
is to support the confederation in the detection, surveillance, prevention and control of zoonoses and 
vector-borne diseases.  Other topics include early detection of new and emerging diseases in the 
context of climate change and the promotion of measures that lead to a reduction in the use of 
antimicrobials, pesticides or biocides. The idea is to have a One Health organization that includes 
delegates from all concerned federal agencies, as well as one delegate for each respective cantonal 
authority.  
Members meet twice a year and the core body of the SBOH is formed by public institutions with 
occasional academic participation and no private stakeholders. The Federal Food Safety and Veterinary 
Office chairs SBOH, which includes representatives of the Federal Office for Public Health, Federal Office 
of the Environment and the Federal Office for Agriculture alongside a Cantonal medical doctor, a 
Cantonal chemist, a Cantonal veterinarian, a Cantonal pharmacist and a representative of the Swiss 
Army Veterinary Service. Members of academic institutions are invited as external experts when 
required. Reference laboratories for infectious animal diseases, public health and food safety are 
contacted according to the situation and topics. The Food Safety and Veterinary Office funds the 
secretariat and members’ salaries are paid by their own institutions. There is no specific budget for 
meetings or campaigns.  
The SBOH’s main achievements are improving communication and information exchange among 
Federal Offices and Cantons. Benefits are apparent as improved coordination between sectors. 
Personnel from offices, who had never met before, are now comfortably discussing freely, making 
decisions or propositions and identifying potential synergies. Representatives in the SBOH continue in 
their professional roles, ensuring they are familiar with the subjects and situations, when discussions 
are necessary. This results in an accelerated response, which is important for emerging diseases. A 
tangible outcome of this new synergy is the creation of the National Strategy on Antibiotic Resistance 
(StAR), developed by the SBOH. 
The main challenge is that they have mandate to generate recommendations for competent authorities, 
who has decision and implementation power. Furthermore, the new data protection regulations 
complicate the process of sharing data in an ideal One Health manner. The SBOH is a young initiative 
and expect to overcome the limitations eventually. 
 
Subsidiary Body One Health, Federal Food Safety and Veterinary Office, Switzerland 
https://www.blv.admin.ch/blv/en/home.html 
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The Swedish Zoonoses Council - Sweden 
The Swedish Zoonoses Council (SZC) was formed in 1997 based on legislation also founding the 
Swedish Zoonosis Center. The SZC started as a reference group for the Zoonosis Center and served as 
a tool to improve communication between authorities of the different sectors. The council is composed 
of risk assessors and risk managers from different authorities with responsibilities in the field of zoonotic 
agents in animals, humans and food. The involved authorities are The National Food Agency, The 
Swedish Board of Agriculture, The Swedish Veterinary Agency, The National Public Health Institute, 
The Swedish Work Environment Authority, County Medical Officers, County Veterinary Officers, and 
representatives of the municipalities. There is no direct participation of the industry and expansion to 
inclusion of academic representatives is under consideration. 
SZC meets four times a year and discuss outbreaks, strategy gaps, communication strategies and 
zoonoses control strategies mainly for STEC, Salmonella, Campylobacter and Listeria. An interest in rat-
transmitted Hantavirus has also emerged. Discussions revolve around humans, animals, food and feed 
in Sweden, but outbreaks in neighboring countries may also be part of the agenda. Outbreaks are the 
main focus, but routine surveillance is also included occasionally.  
Data is not exchanged during the meetings. Information on outbreaks is presented and discussed, but 
no actual data is shared other than related to the actual outbreak and no data interpretation occurs. 
Legislation on data sharing is very restrictive especially in regards to samples from private persons or 
producers and this remains the main challenge for the Council. A project called Zoonoses Co-operation 
is trying to address the issue of data sharing, but has not succeeded yet. 
Benefits of their activities include an increased understanding between sectors at administration levels, 
especially at county and municipality level. This generates more direct communication and allows for 
better agreement on the development of shared policies and strategies. Because Swedish authorities 
are very sectioned, a lack of effective communication channels could hamper the work on zoonoses 
and outbreak investigations. In addition, SZC do suggest projects, but have no funding of their own.  
 
National Veterinary Institute (SVA), Sweden 
https://www.sva.se/en/about-sva/the-swedish-zoonosis-centre 
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DANMAP surveillance - Denmark 
DANMAP is the Danish Programme for surveillance of antimicrobial consumption and resistance (AMR) 
in bacteria from animals, food and humans. It is a multi-partner project that involves all sectors 
connected to the farm-to-fork continuum in a One Health perspective. The DANMAP programme is 
funded jointly by the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Environment and Food and the Ministry of 
Higher Education and Science.  
The programme started in 1996, by a group of researchers from the former National Veterinary Serum 
Laboratory, who believed that the occurrence of AMR in humans was driven by the use of antimicrobials 
not only in humans but also in animals. This belief is still the main rationale behind the program and 
its main driver is reducing AMR in human pathogens. It covers the use of antimicrobials in humans and 
animals and AMR is surveyed along the farm-to-patient chain. Data is collected by surveys along the 
whole food chain from live animals and carcasses to products at retail and in laboratory samples from 
ill people and animals. Antimicrobial usage data is collected electronically from all prescriptions in both 
animal and public health, and analysed and interpreted annually. Although all direct stakeholders are 
public, non-public sectors can be contacted to help explain specific observations. 
DANMAP is a large programme, which includes several One Health initiatives beyond the regular 
surveillance activity. Research, teaching, international training on integrated surveillance systems and 
laboratory methodology, national communication initiatives to the public and production of the DANMAP 
Report are examples of the additional initiatives usually carried out in collaboration between sectors. 
The DANMAP report has been a template for national reports around the world presenting results of 
the national monitoring of antimicrobial use and AMR in food animals, food and humans. It is produced 
by the National Food Institute, Technical University of Denmark in collaboration with Statens Serum 
Institut, the national public health institute. The National Food Institute is the main driver for data 
compiling on zoonoses and animal data and Statens Serum Institute analyses the remaining human 
data. The programme has a cross-sector steering committee, where strategic decisions, communication 
plans and development of the programme is discussed.    
The close and regular collaboration between sectors has several benefits. In an early stage of the 
programme, it was made possible to see the concurrent usage of growth promoters in the animal 
population and the increasing AMR in humans, which resulted in the ban of growth promoters initially 
in Denmark and later in the EU. The close cross-sector collaboration has also resulted in joint teaching 
sessions, lectures and receiving formal foreign delegations in partnership rather than as separate 
sectors.  
Current challenges include changes in the organizations participating and in the Danish surveillance 
institutes in general. Exciting future challenges include implementation of novel genomic methods, 
whilst maintaining the historical value of the surveillance data and finding ways to include the 
environment to enhance the One-Health-ness of the programme. Plans to increase the OH-ness of data 
interpretation and surveillance design are also on-going.  
 
National Food Institute, Technical University of Denmark 
https://www.food.dtu.dk/publikationer/antibiotikaresistens/danmap 
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AMRCO - The Antimicrobial Resistance Coordinating Office - Singapore 
The Antimicrobial Resistance Coordinating Office (AMRCO) started its full operations in September 2018 
in the National Centre for Infectious Diseases under the Singaporean Ministry of Health. The office was 
established as part of their National Strategic Action Plan on Antimicrobial Resistance (AMR). A One 
Health AMR workgroup was created in 2017 to draft the National Plan, and it was apparent that a 
coordinating body was needed to facilitate and direct all the planned cross-sectoral integration. The 
main objectives are 1) the analysis and coordination of surveillance data and evaluation of control 
measures; 2) coordination of AMR research; 3) development and coordination of AMR education efforts 
across sectors and 4) provide secretarial support for various national committees for AMR.  
AMRCO’s main task is to assess situations that could benefit from cross-sectoral approaches and 
propose areas of collaboration.  As of now, there is no integration of surveillance between public health, 
animal health and food sectors. However, there are some overlaps among the prioritised pathogens, 
namely ESBL, MRSA and E.coli. The animal and food sectors also overlap on their interest in Salmonella. 
From this, cross-sectoral topics have been identified and a pilot for integration is currently being 
discussed.  
The partners and stakeholders vary according to the objective. For education, they involve the Ministry 
of Education, the Health Promotion Board, the Pharmaceutical Society, nursing schools, medical schools 
and health care institutions. A plan to educate farmers on the importance of not abusing antimicrobials 
is in the pipeline for implementation by the animal sector. Public, private and academic stakeholders 
are all involved and funding for daily office operations comes from the Ministry of Health, while projects 
to educate the public are financed by the Health Promotion Board. Surveillance is expected to be funded 
by the individual sectors and currently, AMRCO does not hold any specific funding for research. 
AMR and antimicrobial use (AMU) surveillance is implemented in all public hospitals and private hospitals 
will start submitting data in 2018. In the next few years, primary care units are also expected to start 
reporting. The Agri-food and Veterinary Agency collects data on animal surveillance and AMU, the latter 
through collaboration with wholesalers of veterinary drugs. For research, AMRCO is currently mapping 
all research done in Singapore to do a gap analysis of what is needed to plan research for the future. 
AMRCO will contact all research institutes and public agencies to propose projects based on the 
identified gaps.  
In 2018, AMRCO took over the production of the national report on AMR and antimicrobial use in public 
hospitals. As of now, public hospitals submit data in spreadsheets, which are collated for the report. 
The new One Health report will include data from the human, environmental, animal and food sectors. 
Data on AMU in animals will be similar to what is reported to the World Organisation for Animal Health. 
Whole genome sequencing is used for outbreak investigations or in research projects, but there are no 
present plans to include these data in the reports. As of now, the One Health reports are only for 
internal circulation in the relevant ministries.  
Although it is a very young initiative, AMRCO already generated some tangible benefits, like establishing 
communication between sectors. Before 2016 and the formation of the One Health AMR working group, 
there was little knowledge of one another’s activities in efforts against AMR. 
As a new and wide-ranging initiative, AMRCO also faces multiple challenges. Public awareness of the 
relevance of AMR is still fairly low and hence demands a high level of effort during the coming years. 
Regarding research gaps, AMRCO does not have funding for research and will need to apply for common 
grants to test policies or proposed interventions. Furthermore, AMR is perceived as a human health 
issue and is not a high priority outside the Ministry of Health. As the issue does not receive widespread 
recognition yet, it will take time for certain regulations to be adjusted to include AMRCOs work.  
 
AMR Coordinating Office, National Centre for Infectious Diseases, Ministry of Health, Singapore 
https://www.ncid.sg/About-NCID/OurDepartments/Antimicrobial-Resistance-Coordinating-
Office/Pages/default.aspx 
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